Moscow Coup, August 1991, Sam Lafranco

From MemoryArchive

Who: Sam Lanfranco 
What: Reflections on Moscow Coup 1991
When: 1991
Where: Moscow

While I work through my impressions of being in Moscow ten days after the coup attempt I will post a couple of "impression" pieces to try to give a sense of what I saw and felt. Here is the first: I spend past week in Moscow trying to make sense out of what is going on after the coup attempt. I watched the Congress sessions on Moscow TV and have read the western press. My first impression is that the political analysis of what is going on in the (ex)USSR is probably better on Moscow TV than it is on most western TV. There are "gems" in the western analysis but too much of it seems more about western "experts" (academic and press) trying to protect their expert status while facing changes they really do not understand. Sorting through the western comment yields slim pickings. On the politics of Gorbachev and Yelstin, our press seems to treat events as a horse race with bets and odds, as a personality race, or as a boxing match. Through the eyes of people in Moscow (which is NOT all the Soviets) one sees Gorbachev, Yeltsin, the Deputies in the Congress, and the leaders of the various republics all as players in a process of redefining the Soviet Union as some sort of federation of sovereign states. Underlying this process is a dual respect for democracy and for the rule of law. The new must be produced in an orderly fashion out of the old. I listened to the Tuesday, September speech by Yeltsin in which he first blamed Gorbachev for setting up the coup attempt by his appointments and then saying that the two of them could (must) work together. In a sense, each understands his historic role. Gorbachev's to build the new federal structure and Yeltsin's is to both protect the interests of the Russian state while not looking like the "Big Brother" in the new federation. Both are not all that popular, Gorbachev less popular than Yeltsin - but there is no popularity contest. One is reminded that both came up under the communist system and neither is fully trusted. I think the lack of trust is a strategic tactic on the part of the public and not so much a pathological distrust. Yeltsin is democratically elected that has that to his credit. Gorbachev is not and has to carry that burden. The Congress's 2300 or so Deputies are duly elected and change has to respect this if change is to occur according to due process. I was told by Gorbechev and Yeltsin supporters that there was a risk that the Congress Deputies would carry out a "legal coup" in the meetings following the coup attempt, i.e., remove Gorbachev as head of the Soviet Union. All sides did not want the new structures (federation of presidents) imposed by fiat. To do so would be seen as extra-legal and raise fears of extra legal moves a la Stalin et. al. I could develop this further but reverence for democracy and due process are what stick in my memory from a week of discussions, Moscow TV etc. As an example I offer the following episodes. As the coup attempt began to crumble, there was anger toward the Communist Party since the leadership had supported the coup attempt. Apparently Popov, the very popular Russian-Greek mayor of Moscow, and Yeltsin asked Gorbachev to sign papers allowing them to seal the offices of the Federal Communist Party and the Russian (or Moscow?) Communist Party. Gorbachev said he wanted think about it and they said there was no time since angry citizens would soon storm the offices and much damage and lose of documents would occur -as did in East Germany. He agreed, Popov assure the public that the offices would be sealed and there were no attacks on the buildings. I walked to the party offices, several blocks long and "guarded" by a total of three of four unarmed police. I walked up to the doors and examined the "[1]" applied to keep people out of the buildings. The doors were -of course- locked as usual but the additional security consisted of a piece of paper tape (1 inch by 8 inches) taped across the two doors, with a notice and two rubber stamped seals on it, and a little piece of wire/string passed through two nail heads and sealed with a little lead seal the size of a pill. For the public it was enough for Popov to say, we will handle it. For me it safe to put my nose and finger six inches away to read the fine print. Not far away were the offices of the KGB. The statue of the founder was removed earlier in the week, by the city to make sure that people would not hurt themselves trying to pull it down themselves. People walked by the KGB as if to say, it is ordinary, it no longer has its power. When asked if it meant that the KGB would go away, the reply was usually no, it would be around but it would just be ordinary, not without its problems but with the sorts of problems that we might have with our CIA and FBI. Over and over again I was told - we would be happy to live with your (my) problems in these areas. Just as small groups of people walked by the KGB building, and gathered around the base that had held the KGB founder's statue, large groups walked around the Russian Parliament (White House) building quietly reaffirming that this is our building with our democratically elected representatives. When the crack KGB trained attack troups were told to go get Yeltsin, and instead voted not to do it, they were most likely weighing the effect that the attack would have on democracy. They were certain that their attack would succeed and they get Yeltsin. They were also certain that the attack would either end the march toward democracy or delay it at the cost of a very bloody civil war. Later I hope to write more clearly on these points, and some on the political economy of the economic mess and prospects for the future. For now I hope these reflections are not seem as too personal. At the academic level I will say that those of us who are worried about how our respective ideological "horses" are playing in the scenario are more likely than not to misunderstand what is going on and - much worse- offer well meaning but ill designed advice.